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BOOK REVIEWS
THE AMERICAN TRADITION IN FOREIGN POLICY.

nenbaum.

Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

By Frank Tan1955.

Pp. xiv,

178. $3.50.
Many recent American writings on international affairs have been
soul searching re-evaluations of American foreign policy which reveal
an uneasy state of mind about the leadership role cast upon the United
States since the turn of the century. These books frankly express a dissatisfaction with the premises upon which American world policy has
been formulated.
In this book, Frank Tannenbaum, a distinguished Columbia University historian, attempts an analysis of the tenets upon which this policy
has been based, and takes exception to the conclusions and preachments
of some of his fellow assessors. Professor Tannenbaum, who is an
established authority on Latin American affairs and the author of books
in sociology, protests vigorously against the flood 6f "realist" literature,
so called because of its charge that the American approach to international relations has been perverted by legalistic, moralistic, utopian,
and sentimental considerations. In his eyes the "realist" writings,
characterized by the books of Professor Hans J. Morgenthau, of the
University of Chicago, and George F. Kennan, a retired career diplomat,
are frankly amoral and aim at the abandonment by the United States
of its humanitarian and pacific traditions with regard to other peoples,
and the replacement of these traditions by the doctrine of the balance
of power.
The American Tradition in Foreign Policy is written lucidly and
with force. Unfortunately, it is a combination of wishful thinking, a
lopsided interpretation of American and world history, and an example
of poor insight into the political process. Nevertheless, it is an effective
statement of a point of view by no means uncommon today in the
United States, and by virtue of this deserves serious consideration.
The thesis running throughout Tannenbaum's statement is that
there has existed a distinct and unique moral quality pertaining to the
American people, and which has been expressed by them in their relations
with other people. This "exuberant and restless power, so recognizably
descriptive of the United States"' has been characterized by self-sacrifice
1. P. 4.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
and sympathy for the weak, and has been the dominant theme of American foreign relations since the inception of the nation. This continuing
motif, which Professor Tannenbaum identifies as the dominating reality
of American foreign policy, is the principle of the "co-ordinate state,"
the belief in the equality of all states and in the dignity and worth of all
peoples. He finds examples of its operation in the American colonial
demand to be treated on a plane of equality with the inhabitants of the
British Isles, in the United States constitutional provision protecting the
equality of all members of the Union, and in the understanding reached
on the admission of new states to be formed out of the western territory
on an equal basis with the original thirteen. He also associates with the
doctrine of the "co-ordinate state" the multilateralization of the Monroe
Doctrine and, indeed, its original promulgation, the Open Door Policy
of John Hay, Woodrow Wilson's advocacy of the League of Nations,
the rise of the Organization of American States, US entry into the
United Nations, and, in general, what he believes is United States support for the principle of the equality of all states. Similarly, and somewhat contradictorily, he also describes the "co-ordinate state" principle
as underlying the British Commonwealth, the Swiss state, and other
international federations. He urges the retention by the American
people of the "co-ordinate state" thesis and the rejection by them of the
advice offered by the "realists."
Professor Tannenbaum's analysis of the "realist" position is unfair,
and his characterization of American foreign policy and of the principles
underlying international organization is inaccurate and contradictory.
His consideration of the "realist" literature is emotional. The Columbia
professor sets up a straw man which he proceeds to demolish with
cavalier ease. He presents both Kennan and Morgenthau as diabolical
disciples of Machiavelli and credits them with a desire to sweep away all
that is good in past American diplomacy. He thereupon denounces
Machiavelli, defends Woodrow Wilson and idealism and feels that he
has justified his position. Any person, however, who has read the works
of Morgenthau and of Kennan recognizes that Tannenbaum's statement
of their views is actually an overstatement and a misrepresentation. At
best the two publicists assert a truism; at worst one of them is open to
the charge of using caustic language in a provocative manner. But
neither is explicitly wicked as Tannenbaum makes out. Both Kennan
and Morgenthau urge that foreign policy should be based on a calculated
estimate of "national interest" and not upon a vague idealism which defies the actual distribution of power in the name of a "principle" or of
a "cause." Morgenthau objects, for example, to "intoxication with moral

BOOK REVIEWS
abstractions . . . which . . . has become the prevailing substitute for
political thought."2 Similarly, Kennan is bothered by the reliance in
American thought upon utopian schemes for rushing the initiation of
super or international institutions which lack a real sociological base for
the solution of material and cultural differences which are both real and
pressing. He attacks, therefore, past policy formulations:
"As you have no doubt surmised, I see the most serious
fault of our past policy formulation to lie in something that I
might call the legalistic-moralistic approach to international
problems. This approach runs like a red skein through our
foreign policy of the last fifty years. It has in it something of
the old emphasis on arbitration treaties, something of the
Hague Conferences and schemes for universal disarmament,
something of the more ambitious American concepts of the role
of international law, something of the League of Nations and
the United Nations, something of the Kellogg Pact, something
of the idea of a universal Article 51 pact, something of the
belief in World Law and World Government." 3
The truism which Kennan and Morgenthau both advance is that
national interest should be the determinant of a nation's foreign policy.
The phrase "national interest" is itself an abstraction which contains
meaning only as applied in specific instances. An assessment of what
is "national interest" must be made on an ad hoc basis. Neither Kennan
nor Morgenthau can be charged a priori with being either immoral or
amoral. In fact, the latter argues that for a statesman to ignore the
interests of his constituents in behalf of a subjective idealism is itself
immoral. Kennan, furthermore, reveals a broad-gauged understanding
of the factors which must be taken into account in determining national
policy. He takes a long-range' enlightened view rather than the narrow
stand Tannenbaum would have his audience believe.
One almost suspects that part of the criticism heaped upon both
Morgenthau and Kennan, whom Tannenbaum and others perhaps identify wrongly as of one opinion, for in given instances the two may and
probably do disagree as to what constitutes "national interest," stems
from the sharpness of Morgenthau's pen. Tannenbaum asserts that
Kennan's argument has "a kind of urbanity, a kind of sensitivity for
the values and shortcomings of the American milieu and a kind of compassion for human frailty that robs it of much of its sting. It is so
2.

MORGENTHAU, IN DEFENSE OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST 4
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950, at 95 (1951).

3. KENNAN,

(1951).
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gently, so persuasively stated, that the reader finds himself carried along
almost to the point of agreement until he realizes that this modest and
restrained presentation is, in fact, a repudiation of every value we
hold." 4 No such compliment, left-handed as it is, can be given to the
University of Chicago professor. Might part of Tannenbaum's hostility
to the writings of the "realists" be an emotional tropism triggered by the
lack of finesse with which Morganthau blasts away many entrenched
shibboleths? Perhaps Tannenbaum would profit from reading anew
Kennan's The Realities of American Foreign Policy.' He may then find
that he has more in common with the "realists" than is admitted between
the covers of The American Tradition in ForeignPolicy.
One great difference, and a crucial one, which distinguishes Tannenbaum from the "realists" is his optimism about human nature.
Whereas Tannenbaum seeks out the moral virtues of the American
people, Morgenthau and Kennan also examine the shortcomings in human nature. They express reservations about man's conduct in the past
and caution those who would assume that man will act differently in the
future. Tannenbaum, employing rose-colored glasses, selects only those
achievements out of the past which to him illustrate the unique moral
qualities of those who inhabit the central portion of North America.
Thus, in Tannenbaum's book, there is implicit a double standard
which fails to survive close scrutiny. Tannenbaum informs his readers
in a chapter entitled, "The American Commitment,"' that the feudal and
monarchical experiences through which Europe has passed have left an
indelible mark on the political ideals and practices of its nations. He
feels that the United States, born as a reaction to European authority,
intolerance, and violence has nurtured a different set of values. In this
manner he justifies as uniquely American the doctrine of the "co-ordinate state" which is seen by him as merely the extension to international
affairs of the ethical premises of American democracy. Yet, perhaps,
unwittingly, by applying the doctrine of the "co-ordinate state" as a
general rule governing the constitution of federations, Tannenbaum contradicts himself. Certainly the Swiss and British are of the Old World,
and the United States was created as a reaction to British behavior. How
then did the Swiss federation and the British Commonwealth come into
being? Also, is it not true that the ideological foundation for the American revolution was largely British and partly French?
4.
5.
6.

P. 164.
Princeton University Press (1954).
Pp. 3-37.
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An examination of American history fails to support the author's
claims about American foreign policy. How justified, for example, is
he in projecting myths held in the United States about domestic affairs
to the realm of international relations? Apart from the desirability of
conducting a foreign policy upon such premises, has in reality American
foreign policy reflected American domestic political ethics? Tannenbaum asserts that the variations in United States policy from the ideal'
of the "co-ordinate state" are "side currents at the edge of the broad
stream of our foreign policy." 7 He amasses a large selection of quotations in support of his view, citing such individuals as John Quincy
Adams, Henry Clay, Charles Sumner, William H. Seward, James G.
Blaine, John Hay, Elihu Root, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Charles Evans Hughes, Reuben J. Clark, Cordell Hull, and Franklin Roosevelt. Yet how many of these persons were oblivious to the
forces operating in international affairs? It is proper to quote the oratorical phrases and high sounding idealism of American statesmen, but
one must also examine their policies in practice. The Monroe Doctrine
was promulgated not solely, if at all, because American statesmen were
interested in the independence of the Latin American states, but because
these statesmen were concerned with the preservation of the independence
of the United States. The doctrine was multilateralized, not because of
faith in the doctrine of the "co-ordinate state" but because it was convenient just before the outbreak of the First World War in Europe to
associate the ABC countries of Latin America in the dealings of the
United States with Mexico. It lessened the burden and vitiated criticism
of the United States in Latin America, criticism which did not make investments there particularly welcome. Certainly among some circles
there was a sense of guilt about Roosevelt's big stick, but unilateral
American intervention in lands to the south, although supposedly repudiated in 1930, has never really been abandoned. Merely, more refined techniques have been employed. American policy makers, for example, did not refrain from bringing about a change in Guatemala when
they felt that United States interests were being undermined by the existing regime.
The Open Door Policy, cited by Tannenbaum as an example of the
operation of the "co-ordinate state" doctrine, is actually proof of just
the opposite. The bluff perpetrated by John Hay at the turn of the
century was concerned not with "our commitments to the ideals of equal
status and the moral integrity of the nation"' but with the possibility that
7. P. 141.

8. P. 97.
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investments of American citizens would be excluded from the Asian
mainland, and with the possibility that a China divided among the European states would serve as bases for the expansion of these states into
areas deemed important to United States security.
Even if the existence of the doctrine of the "co-ordinate state" is
left unproved, is it nonetheless necessarily a desirable basis upon which
to conduct foreign policy?
The concept of the equality of states, Tannenbaum's views notwithstanding, had its origin not in the United States but in Europe in the
writings of the international lawyers. When it was first advanced it
was rationalization of monarchial power. Today, however, the doctrine
runs counter to the growing economic and cultural interdependence of
the world. In the past, it has served as an argument to protect the rights
of certain peoples against their neighbors, and undoubtedly will still be
used for this purpose. Yet, it can and also has been used to frustrate
the policies of the majority of the earth's inhabitants. If, as Tannenbaum wishes, international organization develops upon the principle of
the equality of all states (and international organization has not developed
in that way) that minority of people occupying the miniscule political
jurisdictions and the under-populated regions will be in a position to
frustrate the common endeavor of the more populated lands. Why, it
may be asked, should Lybia or Afghanistan have as much a voice in
international relations as either India or the United States? Clearly, the
concept of the equality of states if useful is only useful in a limited
manner. There is no evidence to support the belief that the recognition
of the "co-ordinate state" principle in the face of the actual inequality
of existing political units is either a step forward in international relations or morally superior to the non-recognition of such a principle.
At one point, the author declares that an adoption of the "coordinate state" thesis within the League of Nations would have saved
the League and would have brought Italy to its knees in the Ethiopian
crisis.
"It can surely be argued that the principle of collective
security failed under the League of Nations precisely because
the League was not built upon the principle of the co-ordinate
state. If all the members of that body had had an equal voice,
Italy's attack upon Ethiopia would have been defeated, and
sanctions, both economic and military, would have been effectively applied." '
9. P. 165.
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Such a statement reflects a clear lack of realization that authority
carries with it a degree of responsibility. No paper majority, in and of
itself, could have converted the great powers to support sanctions against
Italy. In this instance, as in many others, The American Tradition in
Foreign Policy presents an unsophisticated picture of the political process
which presupposes the existence of a powerful sense of community among
nations, when, in fact, such a community is still struggling to be born. In
this respect it follows in the tradition of the old-line peace advocates
who objected to the intrusion of "politics" into international relations
and who cherished as an ideal international cooperation and a federation
of the nations upon the basis of a universal international legal norm, but
who failed to appreciate the primitive nature of international law.
Thus, in numerous ways Thw American Traditionin ForeignPolicy
obscures with slogans vital issues which require consideration. The book
suffers, furthermore, from being loosely organized and inexcusably
redundant."
MARTIN DAVID DUBINt

By F. A. Mann. Second Edition.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. Pp. xi, 488. $6.15.
THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY.

The enormous depreciation, and in several instances complete collapse, of numerous currencies, together with the great disequilibrium of
international balances of payment and other economic changes which
have emerged from the two great wars, have brought to the forefront
the importance of monetary law. The gold standard toppled. What was
believed to be its automatic mechanism safeguarding the stability of the
value of money was supplanted by legislative fiats.1 In numerous countries gold and other valuation clauses were outlawed.! Severe exchange
control restrictions, and discriminatory trade practices frequently curtail
10. Tannebaum stated his case more effectively in an article, of which this
See, for example, The Balance of Power Versus the Co-ordilate
State, 67 POL. Sci. Q. 173 (1952).
t Teaching Associate, Calumet Center, Indiana University.
1. For some of the writings on this subject, see NAT'L INDUSTRIAL CoNbook is an expansion.

FERENcE BD., SHALL WE RETURN TO THE GOLD STANDARD--Now?, STUDIES IN BUSINESS
EcoNoM cs No. 43 (1954); KENT, MONEY AND BANKING 21, 22, 59 (1951); BEYEN,
MONEY IN THE MAELSTROM 37-39 (1949).

2. 48 STAT. 112, 31 U.S.C. § 463 (1952); Gold Clause Act, 1937, 1 GEO. 6 c. 33
(Canada); Gold Clause Act, 1939, 3 GEO. 6 c. 45 (Canada). With respect to other
countries, see NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW 280-83 (1950).

